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Understanding the Statutory Tax Practitioner
Privilege: What Is Tax Shelter "Promotion"?
Jared T. Meiert

The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) is given the broad authority
to conduct investigations, file suit, and request documents from
taxpayers when necessary to enforce the provisions of the Internal
Revenue Code.' The IRS can seek to acquire written communications
between a taxpayer and his tax adviser.2 Such documents may include
tax opinions and tax planning memoranda.! Taxpayers represented by
lawyers are able to protect some of these communications through the
common law attorney-client privilege.! Certain nonlawyers are also
authorized to represent taxpayers before the IRS and to give tax
planning advice, but their communications fall outside the scope of
the attorney-client privilege. This group includes accountants,
enrolled agents, and enrolled actuaries.!
In 1998, Congress created the tax practitioner-client privilege,'
which extended the protections of the attorney-client privilege to
certain communications between nonlawyer tax practitioners and
their clients.! This statutory privilege, however, carves out an
exception-it does not apply to written communications related to the
"promotion" of a client's participation in a tax shelter.
Recently, a disagreement has arisen regarding the scope of this
exception and the meaning of the word "promotion." In Countryside
t BS 2008, Brigham Young University; JD Candidate 2011, The University of Chicago
Law School.
1 See IRC § 7602.
2
Ronald E. Friedman and Dan L. Mendelson, The Need for CPA-Client Privilege in
Federal Tax Matters, 27 Tax Adviser 154, 154 (1996).
3
See id at 155.
4
See Upjohn v United States, 449 US 383, 387-88, 396 (1981) (applying this "oldest of the
[common law] privileges for confidential communications" to hold that a corporation can
withhold from the IRS documents generated by its general counsel).
5 31 CFR § 10.3.
6
Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998 § 3411, Pub L No 105-206,
112 Stat 685, 750, codified at IRC § 7525.
7 See IRC § 7525(a).
8
IRC § 7525(b).
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Limited Partnership v Commissioner of Internal Revenue,' the Tax

Court relied on legislative history to hold that tax advice given as part
of a close and routine relationship was not promotion and therefore
survived the tax shelter exception." But in Valero Energy Corp v
United States," the Seventh Circuit rejected legislative history
arguments and held that promotion can include advice given by a
taxpayer's "long-time advisors.""
How broadly courts define promotion for the purpose of the tax
shelter exception has a major impact on the usefulness of the
privilege." The statute uses a vague and potentially overbroad
definition for "tax shelter" found in IRC § 6662(d), further placing the
scope of the exception in question." A primary goal of professionalclient privileges is to encourage individuals to be candid with their
advisers," but this goal will not be achieved unless courts apply the
privilege predictably." Because such a large portion of tax planning is
done by accountants," resolution of this disagreement will bring
much-needed stability.
This Comment proposes a resolution to the disagreement. Part I
provides necessary background information, including an overview of
tax shelters, followed by an examination of IRC § 7525 and its
legislative history. Part II discusses the case law and the disagreement
over the meaning of promotion. Part III sets forth a solution to the

9

132 Tax Ct 347 (2009).
Id at 353-55, quoting Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998
Conference Report, HR Rep No 105-599, 105th Cong, 2d Sess 269 (1998).
11 569 F3d 626 (7th Cir 2009).
12
Id at 628, 632.
13
A survey of more than one thousand tax practitioners found that 43 percent of tax
professionals agree that "the scope of the privilege is greatly limited" by the tax shelter
exception and would apply infrequently. Christine C. Bauman and Anna C. Fowler, The
Expanded Taxpayer Confidentiality Privilege: A Review and Assessment of IRC Section 7525, 14
Adv Tax 37, 50 (2002). Over 80 percent of the tax professionals did not agree that the privilege
has "enhanced" the ability of professionals to "grow" their practices by "leveling the playing
field." Id.
14
See IRC §6662(d).
15
See Upjohn, 449 US at 389.
16
See id at 393 ("An uncertain privilege, or one which purports to be certain but results in
widely varying applications by the courts, is little better than no privilege at all."); John Gergacz,
Using the Attorney-Client Privilege as a Guide for Interpreting I.R.C. § 7525, 6 Houston Bus &
Tax L J 240, 241 (2006) (arguing that uncertainty in the applicability of the privilege "means that
one must [ ] assume that everything disclosed may later be revealed").
17 Consider Edward L. Maydew and Douglas A. Shackelford, The Changing Role of
Auditors in CorporateTax Planning*28 (NBER Working Paper No 11504, June 2005), online at
http://www.nber.org/papers/w11504 (visited Jan 24, 2011). For the average S&P 500 company,
auditing firms performed $2.5 million worth of tax services in 2003. Id at *19. Much of this work
would have been done by CPAs. Consider Alyson Petroni, Note, Unpacking the AccountantClient Privilegeunder I.R.C. Section 7525, 18 Va Tax Rev 843, 847 (1999).
10
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disagreement, first criticizing the Tax Court's reasoning then using
accepted rules of statutory construction to demonstrate that
promotion should be interpreted broadly to mean "furtherance" or
"encouragement" and should not depend on the length or quality of
an advising relationship. Part III then examines the § 6662(d)
definition of tax shelter and shows that a broad definition of
promotion will not result in the exception swallowing the privilege or
interfering with routine and customized tax planning, because courts
should limit the meaning of tax shelter in light of previously
overlooked Treasury regulations.
I. BACKGROUND: THE § 7525(B) TAX SHELTER EXCEPTION
A. Tax Planning and Tax Shelters
There is no single definition for tax shelter. One dictionary
defines a tax shelter generally as "a strategy, investment, or tax code
provision that reduces tax liability,"'" but the Code employs a specific
definition." Taxpayers are generally free to structure their
transactions in ways that reduce their tax liability.' Consequently, the
term "tax shelter" has been applied both to legitimate attempts to
reduce one's tax burden and to abusive tax planning techniques that
manipulate the Code.21 For purposes of this background section, tax

shelter will refer to any attempt to reduce one's tax burden. Abusive
planning practices will be referred to as either "abusive tax shelters"
or "abusive tax planning."
It is important to understand some of the basic differences

between abusive and legitimate tax planning. Legitimate tax planning
generally consists of tax-conscious decisions that are consistent with
the Code and congressional intent. Abusive tax shelters, on the other

hand, typically seek to exploit the literal language of the Code and
realize tax savings in ways not envisioned by Congress.n They are
highly complex transactions that would not be entered into for any

18

Merriam-Webster'sCollegiate Dictionary 1281 (Merriam-Webster 11th ed 2009).

19 See text accompanying notes 68-69.
20
See Helvering v Gregory, 69 F2d 809, 810 (2d Cir 1934) (explaining that "there is not
even a patriotic duty to increase one's taxes").
21
See Donald L. Korb, Shelters, Schemes, and Abusive Transactions: Why Today's
Thoughtful U.S. Tax Advisors Should Tell Their Clients to "Just Say No," 851 PLIfTax 859, 863
(2008) ("Tax shelters can be grouped into three broad categories: legitimate tax shelters, gray
area tax shelters, and abusive tax shelters.").
22
See id.
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reason other than their tax benefits." Abusive shelters often involve
little to no risk of economic loss and little to no possibility of profit.'
Abusive tax shelters can be created by long-term advisers who
develop customized plans, or they can be prepackaged and mass
marketed. Customized tax planning (whether legitimate or abusive)
typically involves an adviser who knows his client's business well and
can give advice that is particular to the firm. This might include advice
on how to structure various transactions and compensation
agreements, or it might include advice on performing abusive
transactions to reduce the client's tax liability in a way not intended
by Congress." Individualized tax planning can be highly abusive and
exploit the same inconsistencies as the selling of mass-marketed tax
shelters.'

A mass market for prepackaged abusive tax shelters began to
thrive in the 1990s.' This market was led by the major accounting
firms,' so an understanding of this type of shelter peddling is
important to understanding Congress's motivation behind the tax
shelter exception. The accounting firms' power over this market was
driven by their massive client bases and global connections. Once a
tax shelter was created, it was replicated and sold in nearly identical
form to hundreds or thousands of corporate clients.29 Due to the large
volume of sales and diminishing average costs, firms marketing these
shelters realized tremendous profits.'
A study conducted by the Senate Permanent Subcommittee on
Investigations of the Committee on Governmental Affairs detailed
23 For typical examples of abusive tax shelters, see IRS, Listed Transactions-LB&ITier I
Issues (Nov 2010), online at http://www.irs.gov/businesses/corporations/article/0,,id=120633,
00.html (visited Jan 26, 2011). Many of the listed transactions are illegal, and all must be
reported on the participant's tax return. Treas Reg § 1.6011-4(b).
24 See Karen C. Burke and Grayson M.P. McCouch, COBRA Strikes Back: Anatomy of a
Tax Shelter,62 Tax Law 59, 65 (2009).
25
See Linda M. Beale, Tax Advice before the Return: The Case for Raising Standards and
Denying Evidentiary Privileges,25 Va Tax Rev 583, 596-97 (2006).
26 See id.
27 For a more extensive discussion of some of the causes of the rise of the corporate tax
shelter mass market, see Department of the Treasury, The Problem of Corporate Tax Shelters:
Discussion,Analysis and Legislative Proposals25-33 (July 1999), online at http://www.treasury.gov/
resource-centerltax-policylDocuments/ctswhite.pdf (visited Jan 25,2011).
28 Tanina Rostain, Sheltering Lawyers: The Organized Tax Bar and the Tax Shelter
Industry, 23 Yale J Reg 77, 88-92 (2006) (explaining how the accounting industry's "bureaucratic
structure, global reach, and enormous client base" enabled the large accounting firms to take the
lead in promoting corporate tax shelters). See also U.S. Tax Shelter Industry: The Role of
Accountants, Lawyers, and Financial Professionals-Four KPMG Case Studies: FLIP, OPIS,
BLIPS, and SC2, S Prt No 108-34, 108th Cong, 1st Sess 21-22 (2003).
29 See S Prt No 108-34 at 53 (cited in note 28).
30 From 1997 to 2001, revenue from tax services in the United States grew 20 percent per
year. See Rostain, 23 Yale J Reg at 91 (cited in note 28).
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these shelter-marketing practices during the late 1990s and early
2000s." The report explains the strategies and business plans of
several accounting firms. KPMG, for example, had an entire
department, the Tax Innovation Center, that was staffed by about a
dozen professionals whose "sole mission [was] to push the
development of new KPMG tax products."3 2 The Center maintained a
"Tax Services Idea Bank" that collected ideas for generic strategies.33
When promising ideas were identified, the Center oversaw their
development and marketing.' The end product would be a generic
plan that could be implemented by almost any taxpayer. KPMG
would then cold-call thousands of potential buyers and pitch them the
latest tax strategy.' The report explains that abusive shelters were also
marketed by PricewaterhouseCoopers and Ernst & Young.' By
targeting taxpayers with large gains to offset and by contacting such a
large number of taxpayers, the firms were highly successful in their
efforts. One commentator estimated that this massive selling of
abusive shelters was reducing tax revenues by billions per year.'
Congress has passed a number of rules designed to increase tax
shelter detection," as well as rules designed to penalize those who
participate in shelters and those who organize shelters." When new
tax shelters are discovered, the government may respond through
multiple avenues. Congress may amend the Code,' or the Treasury

See generally S Prt No 108-34 (cited in note 28).
Id at 28-29.
33
Id at 30.
34 Id at 30-32.
35
S Prt No 108-34 at 24, 53 (cited in note 28). Upon selling the strategy, the promoting
firm would then take whatever actions were necessary to facilitate the implementation of the
plan. See IRS Implements Promoter Penalty by Analogy to Corporate Tax Shelter Rules, 100 J
Tax 247,247 (2004).
36 S Prt No 108-34 at 7-8 (cited in note 28).
37
See Joseph Bankman, The New Market in Corporate Tax Shelters, 83 Tax Notes 1775,
1781 (1999).
38
See IRC §§ 6011, 6111-12.
39
See IRC § 6662 (imposing a penalty for underpayment of 20 percent in addition to the
amount owed and specifically omitting tax shelters from a penalty reduction section); IRC
§ 6662A (authorizing the same penalties as § 6662 to reportable transactions); IRC § 6664
(preventing taxpayers from arguing reliance on the opinion of a tax adviser if that adviser is a
material adviser who "participates in the organization, management, promotion, or sale" of the
transaction for which the taxpayer underpaid); IRC § 6700 (imposing fines of up to $1,000 on
any person who assists in organizing a tax shelter and 50 percent of the gross income derived
from the shelter on those who participate in it).
40 Many of the early tax shelters were eliminated by the Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub L
No 99-514, 100 Stat 2085. New Code provisions in that Act, such as the passive-activity loss rules
codified in IRC § 469, ended real estate shelters that took advantage of depreciation to defer tax
payment for many years. Tax Reform Act of 1986 § 501, 100 Stat at 2233-41.
31

32
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may promulgate new regulations or issue rulings that close the
loopholes that are being exploited."
In addition to efforts by Congress and the Treasury, courts have
developed doctrines to disallow claimed tax savings from abusive tax
shelters. If a transaction creates tax benefits in a way that is
inconsistent with the Code or with congressional intent, a court may
deny tax benefits even though the transaction complies with the literal
language of the Code.42 Under the business purpose doctrine, a court
may disallow the claimed tax results of a transaction if the transaction
lacked a legitimate business purpose, such as an expectation of
making a profit.' In other words, if a taxpayer was motivated by no
purpose other than the desire to secure some tax benefit, then those
benefits may be denied by courts.' The closely related economic
substance doctrine allows courts to disallow benefits if the transaction
"lacks economic effects or substance other than the generation of tax
benefits."' These tests developed as common law doctrines, but they
were recently codified in IRC § 7701(o).' That provision explains that
for a transaction to have economic substance, it must change the
taxpayer's economic position "in a meaningful way," and the taxpayer
must have a "substantial" nontax purpose for entering into the
transaction.47

41
See generally, for example, Tax Avoidance Using Artificially High Basis, Notice 2000-44,
2000-2 Cumulative Bull 255 (Sept 5, 2000) (making the Son of Boss tax shelter a "listed
transaction" and explaining that its tax benefits would be challenged).
42 See, for example, Knetsch v United States, 364 US 361, 367-69 (1960) (rejecting the
petitioner's literal interpretation of the Code because it was not the "meaning [that] plainly
appear[ed]" when the statute as a whole and legislative history were considered).
43 See Gregory v Helvering, 293 US 465, 469-70 (1935).
44 See Frank Lyon Co v United States, 435 US 561, 583-84 (1978); Stobie Creek Investments
v United States, 608 F3d 1366, 1376-77 (Fed Cir 2010) (concluding that a business was not
entitled to a tax benefit because the transaction that created it lacked "economic reality," as
there was no "reasonable possibility" of making a profit and the tax result was "purely
fictional").

45

Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc v Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 254 F3d 1313, 1316 (11th

Cir 2001). In Winn-Dixie, grocer Winn-Dixie purchased life insurance policies for its employees,
then borrowed against those policies at high interest rates to purchase additional policies.
Income on the cash value of a life insurance policy is tax exempt. Because interest payments on
debt are normally deductible, Winn-Dixie stood to receive tax benefits of billions of dollars over
sixty years. Id at 1315. Even though the relevant code provision explicitly allowed the claimed
interest-payment deductions, the court disallowed the benefits. Id at 1316-17. The court relied
on the fact that there was no chance that Winn-Dixie could have generated a pretax profit-the
borrowing costs exceeded the value of the insurance policies. Additionally, a large grocer with
tens of thousands of employees derives no real benefit from insuring every worker-corporateowned life insurance is typically purchased only to insure against losing key employees. See id.
46 Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010 § 1409(a), Pub L No 111-152,
124 Stat 1029, 1067-68, codified at IRC § 7701(o).
47 Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010 § 1409(a), 124 Stat at 1068.

What Is Tax Shelter "Promotion"?

2011]

677

IRC § 7525 and Its Legislative History

B.

Ever since nonlawyer tax professionals became authorized to
practice before the IRS, there has been increasing competition
between attorneys and accountants. Accounting firms have
successfully gained control of a massive share of the market for tax
services.' But before § 7525 was passed, tax attorneys still had the
major advantage of the attorney-client privilege.
Although the attorney-client privilege varies slightly by
jurisdiction, it generally applies to information that is communicated
between a client and a lawyer in confidence and for the purpose of
obtaining legal advice. 9 If a client claims the privilege and these
elements are met, then any privileged materials are protected from
summons in discovery. The privilege is held by the client until it is
waived through disclosure to a party outside the attorney-client
relationship.' But the attorney-client privilege does not apply to
communications in furtherance of the client's participation in a crime
or fraud (known as the "crime-fraud exception")." Tax lawyers may
therefore prevent the IRS from receiving the bulk of tax planning
memoranda as long as the transactions are not criminal or so abusive
as to constitute fraud. This gave tax lawyers a strong advantage in
attracting clients.
Accountants desired a similar privilege to keep from falling
behind in the tax services market. In 1984, the Supreme Court
explicitly affirmed that accountants do not enjoy a common law
confidentiality privilege with their clients.52 After this defeat in the
court system, advocates of a nonlawyer privilege were forced to turn
to Congress. The American Institute of Certified Public Accountants
(AICPA) formed a coalition to sponsor legislation to create such a
privilege." Despite opposition by lawyers,' accountants finally
succeeded in 1998 when Congress created the § 7525 privilege.
See note 17.
See, for example, United States v United Shoe Machinery Corp, 89 F Supp 357, 358-59
(D Mass 1950).
48
49

50

Id.

Id. See also In re Antitrust GrandJury, 805 F2d 155, 164 (6th Cir 1986). For a discussion
of the relationship between the crime-fraud exception and the tax shelter exception, see
note 179.
52
See United States v Arthur Young & Co, 465 US 805,817 (1984) (declining to extend the
attorney-client privilege to accountants).
53
See Bauman and Fowler, 14 Adv Tax at 39 (cited in note 13) (describing the AICPA's
goal as to "level the playing field" because small businesses are unable to hire lawyers every
time they need tax-related communications to be privileged).
54 See Jerome J. Shestack, ABA Opposes Extension of the Attorney-Client Privilege to
Nonlawyers, 1998 Tax Notes Today 73-25, IN 1-3 (Apr 16, 1998). See also Paul R. Rice, AccountantClient Privilege A Misdirected Debate, 1998 Tax Notes Today 109-89, IM3-6 (June 8, 1998)
51

678

The University of Chicago Law Review

[78:671

1. The privilege.
Passed as part of the 184-page Internal Revenue Service
Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998," § 7525 secures for tax
practitioners "the same common law protections of confidentiality"
that exist under the common law attorney-client privilege. These
protections extend to "communication between a taxpayer and any
federally authorized tax practitioner."" The privilege applies only in
noncriminal tax proceedings, either before the IRS or in federal court
if the United States is a party."
Section 7525 protects only tax "advice." 9 This includes tax
planning' and preparations for tax-related litigation." Taxpayers may
therefore seek to protect tax opinions, tax planning memoranda,
written evaluations of how various transactions may be treated by the
IRS, and documents detailing various alternatives that were
considered during planning. 62 Communications regarding preparation
of a tax return are not protected, because tax return preparation is not
legal advice.' "Communications from a client that neither reflect the

(describing attorneys' opposition to legislation granting accountants a privilege comparable to
attorney-client privilege as being based on differing professional codes of conduct). Aside from
the reasons explicitly articulated by the ABA, there were obvious personal interests at stake,
because the extension of the privilege to nonlawyers would represent a "major loss of revenue
for tax lawyers." Id at 3.
55
Pub L No 105-206, 112 Stat 685.
56
IRC § 7525(a)(1):
With respect to tax advice, the same common law protections of confidentiality which apply
to a communication between a taxpayer and an attorney shall also apply to a
communication between a taxpayer and any federally authorized tax practitioner to the
extent the communication would be considered a privileged communication if it were
between a taxpayer and an attorney.
57
58

59

IRC § 7525(a)(1).
IRC § 7525(a)(2).
IRC § 7525(a)(1). The statute defines tax advice as "advice given by an individual with

respect to a matter which is within the scope of the individual's authority to practice [before the
IRS]." IRC § 7525(a)(3)(B). Courts have specified that the services must be legal in nature. See
United States v Frederick, 182 F3d 496, 502 (7th Cir 1999) (noting that the statute does not
suggest that the privilege extends when nonlawyer tax practitioners "are doing other than
lawyers' work"). See also Evergreen Trading, LLC v United States, 80 Fed Cl 122, 134 (2007)
(analyzing legislative history to determine that § 7525 did not create a privilege that extends
beyond the historic types of work protected by attorney-client privilege).
60 See Claudine Pease-Wingenter, Does the Attorney-Client Privilege Apply to Tax
Lawyers? An Examination of the Return PreparationException to Define the Parameters of
Privilege in the Tax Context, 47 Washburn L J 699, 725 (2008).
61 See Valero, 569 F3d at 630.
62 See Friedman and Mendelson, 27 Tax Adviser at 155 (cited in note 2).
63
Frederick, 182 F3d at 500 ("The information that a person furnishes the preparer of his
tax return is furnished for the purpose of enabling the preparation of the return, not the
preparation of a brief or an opinion letter."). See also United States v KPMG LLP, 237 F Supp 2d

2011]1

What Is Tax Shelter "Promotion"?

679

lawyer's thinking nor are made for the purpose of eliciting the
lawyer's professional advice or other legal assistance are not
privileged."' Courts have clarified that the privilege is subject to the
traditional limitations on the attorney-client privilege.'
Both the House and the Senate explanations of the privilege
make clear that the goal was to increase parity between attorneys and
nonattorneys doing the same tax work-that the privilege should not
depend on "whether the advisor is also licensed to practice law.""
According to the conference report, the goal of the provision was to
allow taxpayers to consult with nonlawyer tax practitioners "in the
61
same manner" that they consult with tax attorneys.
2. The tax shelter exception.
Section 7525(a) describes the privilege, and § 7525(b) carves out
the exception for tax shelter advice. The exception provides that the
privilege does not extend to written communications that are "in
connection with the promotion of the direct or indirect participation
of the person in any tax shelter (as defined in § 6662(d)(2)(C)(ii))."'
Section 6662(d) defines a tax shelter as "a partnership or other entity,
any investment plan or arrangement, or any other plan or
arrangement, if a significantpurpose of such partnership, entity, plan,
or arrangement is the avoidance or evasion of Federal income tax.,,m
The tax practitioner privilege therefore does not apply when the
adviser is "promoting" participation in transactions that have a
"significant purpose" of avoiding federal income tax.
Because § 6662 uses the broad significant-purpose definition of
tax shelter, the tax shelter exception might seem to reach most, if not
all, tax planning communications with tax advisers. There is only one
reason taxpayers pay tax advisers to communicate with them: to save
35, 42 (DDC 2002) (declining to apply the privilege to a letter concerning tax consequences of a
past transaction because the advice was primarily for preparation of a tax return).
6
Frederick, 182 F3d at 500.
65 See, for example, United States v BDO Seidman, 337 F3d 802, 810 (7th Cir 2003).
66 Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act of 1997, HR Rep No 105-364,
105th Cong, 1st Sess 66 (1997); Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998,
S Rep No 105-174, 105th Cong, 2d Sess 70 (1998).
67 HR Rep No 105-599 at 88 (cited in note 10).
68 IRC §7525(b).
69 IRC § 6662(d)(2)(C)(ii) (emphasis added). Section 6662 is a penalty provision for the
substantial understatement of taxable income. IRC § 6662(a). In general, if a taxpayer understates
her income, but she relied on a favorable opinion from a tax professional in doing so, she is exempt
from these penalties. IRC § 6662(d)(2)(B). There is, however, no safety in relying on tax advice for
participation in a tax shelter. IRC § 6662(d)(2)(C). In other words, if a taxpayer understates her
income because of a transaction that is later held to be an abusive tax shelter, then the taxpayer is
subject to the penalties, with or without reliance on a professional opinion.
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on taxes. When the exception was introduced, some worried that the
exception would be applied to legitimate and routine tax advice."
Senator Connie Mack expressed dissatisfaction that the exception was
"vague" and could arguably "be read to include all tax planning.""
Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan stated that due to the broad
exception, "most taxpayers will never be eligible to assert [the
privilege], and many will be surprised to learn about its limitations.""
Anticipating the concern that the exception might swallow all tax
planning, the legislative history contains numerous statements
regarding the exception's proper scope. On the floor of the Senate,
Senator Mack stated that the exception "was meant to target written
promotional and solicitation materials used by the peddlers of
corporate tax shelters."' Recall that in 1998 the abusive practice of
mass-marketing tax shelters was well underway and was led by the
major accounting firms." Legislators feared that, without the
exception, the privilege would help large accounting firms evade
government efforts to cut back on mass-marketed shelters.
Language in the conference report also suggests that the
exception was intended to target abusive practices other than routine
or individualized tax planning: "The Conferees do not understand the
promotion of tax shelters to be part of the routine relationship
between a tax practitioner and a client. Accordingly, the Conferees do
not anticipate that the tax shelter limitation will adversely affect such
routine relationships."7
As the preceding discussion shows, since the statute was enacted
there has been tension between the broad definition of tax shelter
(the significant-purpose definition) and the legislative record, which
demonstrates Congress's intent that the exception not interfere with
routine relationships. This tension set the stage for courtroom battles
over the proper scope of the exception as it applied to "routine"
relationships.
70 See note 135. See also Calvin H. Johnson, Corporate Tax Shelters, 1997 and 1998, 80 Tax
Notes 1603, 1604 (1998) (emphasizing the broad scope of the significant-purpose definition).
71 144 Cong Rec S 14735 (July 8, 1998) (Sen Mack).
72
Id at S 14693 (Sen Moynihan).
73 Id at S 14735 (Sen Mack).
74 See notes 28-29 and accompanying text.
75 HR Rep No 105-599 at 269 (cited in note 10). This is the exact language relied on in
Countryside when the court held that advice given in routine relationships is not promotion.
Countryside, 132 Tax Ct at 353-54.
76 Since its passage in 1998, the tax practitioner privilege has been litigated several times.
The earliest cases established that the privilege would protect only legal advice, because the
privilege was no broader than the attorney-client privilege. Thus, it did not extend to the
preparation of a tax return. KPMG, 237 F Supp 2d at 39; Doe v KPMG, LLP, 325 F Supp 2d
746, 753 (ND Tex 2004). Another line of cases addresses the question whether the § 7525
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II. TWO VIEWS OF "PROMOTION"
Countryside: Routine Advice Is Not "Promotion"

A.

About two years after the United States v Textron Inc district

court opinion, the Tax Court decided Countrysideand interpreted the
exception similarly.' Timothy Egan, a partner at the accounting firm
PricewaterhouseCoopers, had provided tax and accounting services to
taxpayer Arthur Winn and the Winn Organization for twenty years.'
These services included tax planning, filing tax returns, and
responding to inquiries from tax officials."
The IRS sought documents related to transactions that took place
with Egan's assistance between 2001 and 2003." These transactions
involved the creation of the limited partnership Countryside LLP, in
which Arthur Winn was a limited partner, and the distribution of

nonmarketable securities in redemption of partnership interests.' The
resulting tax consequences were very favorable for Winn. The IRS
privilege may protect a taxpayer's identity. Compare BDO Seidman, 337 F3d at 812 (finding
identity not to be privileged), with United States v Arthur Andersen, LLP, 273 F Supp 2d 955,
959-60 (ND Ill 2003) (finding identity to be privileged). Only a handful of these cases turned on
an interpretation of the tax shelter exception. In United States v BDO Seidman, LLP, 492 F3d
806 (7th Cir 2007), the court held that the tax shelter exception applies regardless of whether the
tax shelter is designed to shelter corporate or noncorporate taxes. Id at 823-24 (concluding that
the definition of "tax shelter" is meant to be somewhat broad). In that case, the issue of
"promotion" was not discussed because the accountant was mass-marketing prepackaged
deals-there was no question that this constituted "promotion." See id at 808. Another case did
not reach the exception because the court determined that the crime-fraud exception applied.
United States v Trenk, 2009 WL 485375, *6-7 (D NJ). Because the §7525 privilege is based on
the attorney-client privilege, the crime-fraud exception is fully applicable. See note 181 and
accompanying text.
In 2007, the District of Rhode Island in United States v Textron Inc, 507 F Supp 2d 138 (D RI
2007), vacd and remd, 577 F3d 21 (1st Cir 2009) (en banc), became the first court to examine the
meaning of promotion and discuss how the exception might apply to long-term tax advisers
giving customized advice. In that case, the IRS sought tax accrual work papers from taxpayer
Textron. Textron claimed that the documents were protected by the § 7525 privilege. The court
held that the privilege was waived when Textron turned the papers over to its independent
auditor. Textron, 507 F Supp 2d at 151-52. The case was overruled by the First Circuit on other
grounds, see Textron, 577 F3d at 31-32, but the district court commented on the scope of the tax
shelter exception. The court asserted that the tax shelter exception "is aimed at communications
by outside tax practitioners attempting to sell tax shelters to a corporate client." Textron, 507 F
Supp 2d at 148. The court relied heavily on legislative history in concluding that the exception
was in fact very narrow. Id.
77
507 F Supp 2d 138 (D RI 2007), vacd and remd, 577 F3d 21 (1st Cir 2009) (en banc).
78 Countryside,132 Tax Ct at 353-54.
79 Id at 351-52.
80

81

Id at 352.

The subpoenaed documents consisted of "Meeting Minutes" recording confidential
planning communications from meetings with Egan. Id at 348.
82 See Countryside Limited Partnershipv Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 95 Tax Ct
Mem Dec (CCH) 1006,1007-09 (2008).
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described these partnership transactions as "tax shelter transactions
known as basis swaps."' Countryside claimed that the summoned
documents were protected by the § 7525 privilege, and the IRS argued
that the tax shelter exception applied because Egan had engaged in
the promotion of Countryside's participation in a tax shelter.
Countryside responded that this "one-on-one" advice was "the
antithesis of a 'promotional' relationship."'
The court began by looking at various dictionary definitions of
promote, then noted the disagreement among two district courts
regarding the meaning of the term." Concluding that the word was
ambiguous, the Tax Court turned to the legislative history. The court
quoted the conference report language: "The Conferees do not
understand the promotion of tax shelters to be part of the routine
relationship between a tax practitioner and a client."" Relying on this
language, the court drew a distinction between advice given in the
course of a close and ongoing relationship and the promotion of
participation in a tax shelter."
The court emphasized the closeness of Egan and Winn's advising
relationship, describing in some detail the regular services rendered
by Egan. Egan communicated with personnel at the Winn
Organization each week, including in-person meetings once or twice a
month." The advice relating to the transactions under scrutiny was
given in response to Winn's request." Egan was paid a flat fee for his
compliance work, and he billed the Winn Organization by the hour
for all other services." Because the promotion of tax shelters is not
part of routine advising relationships (according to the conference
report), the court held that Egan's advice for these transactions was
not promotion. Thus, the exception did not apply, and the documents

Countryside,132 Tax Ct at 351.
Id.
85 Id at 353. The two cases cited were the lower court decisions in Valero Energy Corp v
United States, 2008 WL 4104368 (ND Ill), and Textron, neither of which was binding precedent.
The Tax Court noted that Textron had determined that promotion applied to "the peddling of
prepackaged tax shelters," Countryside, 132 Tax Ct at 353, citing Textron, 507 F Supp 2d at 148,
while Valero had concluded that "promotion" applied more broadly to include advisers "who
organize[] or assist[] in organizing a tax shelter." Countryside, 132 Tax Ct at 353, quoting Valero,
2008 WL 4104368 at *18.
86 Countryside, 132 Tax Ct at 353-54, quoting HR Rep 105-599 at 269 (cited in note 10).
87 Countryside, 132 Tax Ct at 354-55.
88 Id at 352.
89 Id at 354. ("Mr. Egan provided tax advice to the Winn organization when requested to
do so."). See also id at 352 (explaining that Egan "did not rely on any generic prototypes,
descriptive materials, or files maintained by [PricewaterhouseCoopers]").
90 Id at 352.
83
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were privileged under § 7525." In short, Countryside relies on the
legislative history and stands for the proposition that custom tax
advice given in a close and ongoing relationship is not promotion.'
Valero: Routine Advising May Be Promotion

B.

Just over a week after the Tax Court opinion was released, the
Seventh Circuit examined the same issue and came to the opposite
result in Valero.' Valero Energy Corporation is a large, Texas-based
oil refining company.' In December 2001, Valero acquired Ultramar
Diamond Shamrock Corporation and its Canadian subsidiaries. In
2002, Valero took advantage of the low relative value of Canadian
currency at the time and engaged in a complex set of transactions that
generated $105 million in tax-deductible foreign-currency losses."
These transactions were conducted at the advice and with the help of
the corporation's long-time tax advisers and accountants at Arthur
Andersen. The transactions consisted of "the creation of spin-off
entities, several same-day wire transfers of cash, a large distribution
from one of the Canadian subsidiaries to a United-States-based
parent, re-classification of a separate foreign subsidiary as a branch of
Valero for tax purposes, and the extinguishment of debt."9
The IRS attempted to obtain various documents prepared by
Valero's long-time accountants in connection with these transactions.
Valero claimed that the documents were protected under § 7525.
Valero, like Countryside, argued that the legislative history showed
that the tax shelter exception was not intended to apply to
individualized advice given in an ongoing advising relationship.' To
give effect to this congressional intent, Valero argued that promotion
must mean the active marketing of prepackaged tax shelters through
advertising.' The IRS, by contrast, argued that promotion simply
means "furtherance" or "encouragement."9

91 Countryside, 132 Tax Ct at 354-55. Countryside does not set forth a bright-line rule. At
some point, a tax practitioner acting in the context of a routine relationship may "cross the line."
Id at 354.
92 See Randolph J. Buchanan, Corporate Tax Shelter Exception to the Accountant-Client
Privilege, 96 Tax Notes 1619, 1626-27 (2002) (suggesting shortly after the bill's passage that this
was the proper interpretation of the exception).
93 569 F3d at 634.
94
Id at 628.
95
Id.
96
Id.
97
Valero, 569 F3d at 632.
98
Id.
99

Id.

The University of Chicago Law Review

684

[78:671

The court reviewed the text of the statute and the referenced tax
shelter definition in § 6662 (the significant-purpose definition),"
concluding that "[n]othing in this definition limits tax shelters to
cookie-cutter products peddled by shady practitioners or distinguishes
tax shelters from individualized tax advice."' The documents that the
IRS sought were prepared as part of a plan to avoid payment of taxes,
and therefore fell squarely within the exception.'" And adopting
Valero's narrow definition of promotion would have the effect of
narrowing § 6662's intentionally broad definition.'" Because this
narrow definition of promotion would create an internal conflict, the
court rejected it. The court concluded that the advice was promotion
and that the tax shelter exception applied."

In sum, the two primary cases interpreting promotion take
divergent approaches. Countryside focused on legislative history and
determined that the exception should not apply to long-term advisers
giving custom advice. Valero represents the opposite approach,
focusing on the broad significant-purpose definition of tax shelter.
Valero declined to give weight to the legislative history and applied
the exception without considering the closeness or length of the
advising relationship.
III. BROADENING AND NARROWING THE SCOPE OF THE EXCEPTION

Current case law leaves the application of the tax shelter
exception in doubt -especially as it relates to advice given by longtime advisers. Countryside holds that "promotion" is typically limited
to advice given outside of a long-term relationship, while Valero holds
that there is no such limitation. This Part resolves the disagreement
and proposes an understanding of the tax shelter exception that is true
to the Code and the Treasury regulations. Part III.A argues that
Countryside's approach should be rejected. There is no statutory basis
for considering the length or closeness of the relationship, and canons
of interpretation suggest a broader meaning of promotion. Instead,
courts should follow Valero's broader understanding of promotion as
furtherance or encouragement.

100 Id.

101 Valero, 569 F3d at 632.
102 See id at 629, 634.
103 Id at 632.
104 See id at 634.
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Valero's approach is incomplete, however, because it fails to
articulate meaningful limits to ensure that normal tax planning can
still be privileged; Valero fails to ensure that the exception will not
swallow the rule. Part III.B resolves this problem by showing that
Treasury regulations suggest it would be proper to place limitations
on the definition of tax shelter to exempt routine customized planning
from the scope of the § 7525(b) exception. Part III.C concludes with
an outline of the decision process that courts should use to determine
whether there was tax shelter promotion.
A. Broadening Countryside's Narrow View of Promotion
Tax shelter promotion, properly understood, has nothing to do
with the length or the closeness of the advising relationship. The Tax
Court concluded otherwise. This section shows that it reached the
wrong result-promotion should be interpreted broadly to mean
furtherance or encouragement. Because the Countryside decision was
based almost exclusively on the legislative history, this section first
reexamines the conference report language on which the court relied.
This section shows that the language was ambiguous. And, with no
real support from the legislative history, there is no textual support
for the Tax Court's position limiting the term promotion. This section
then proceeds to show that a court need not even reach the legislative
history to properly interpret promotion -the application of two rules
of statutory interpretation tips the scales in favor of a broader
definition of promotion.
1. A second look at the legislative history.
After concluding that promotion was ambiguous as used in the
statute, the Tax Court turned to the legislative history. Because the
conference report indicated that the exception should not interfere
with routine planning, the Tax Court determined that promotion does
not occur when advice is given as part of a routine relationship."
The language on which the court relied is ambiguous: "The
Conferees do not understand the promotion of tax shelters to be part
of the routine relationship between a tax practitioner and a client.
Accordingly, the Conferees do not anticipate that the tax shelter
limitation will adversely affect such routine relationships."" The court
treats this as a statement meant to clarify the meaning of promotionif an adviser has a routine relationship with a client, then any advice

105 Countryside, 132 Tax Ct at 352-53.
106

HR Rep No 105-599 at 269 (cited in note 10).
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given is not promotion. But there is an alternative, equally plausible
reading of this language-that the statement clarifies the meaning of
"routine relationship." If an adviser is promoting tax shelters, then the
advising relationship is not "routine." Read this way, the conference
report offers no support for the Tax Court's position. Instead, the
conferees were simply explaining why they were not concerned that
the exception would ruin proper advising relationships: proper
advising relationships do not involve tax shelter promotion.
One court read this same language a third way in 2007. The
Seventh Circuit, in United States v BDO Seidman, LLP,'0 interpreted
this language as articulating the rationalefor the tax shelter exception,
rather than as a limitation on the meaning of promotion or routine
relationship." The court quoted the conference report and then
explained that this rationale for the exception "goes to the necessity
of the communications to achieve the beneficial aims of the
privilege."" In other words, the conference report was emphasizing
that the beneficial goal of the privilege is to encourage open
communication with routine advisers who give legitimate planning
advice. If an adviser is promoting tax shelters, then there is no social
value in protecting those communications from subpoena. The
privilege therefore does not extend to advisers who are promoting tax
shelters. There are thus at least three plausible ways to read the
conference report language on which Countryside relied. The Tax
Court erred by failing to consider-or even acknowledge-these
alternative plausible readings, relying solely on ambiguous legislative
history to adopt a narrow interpretation of promotion.
2.

Canons of interpretation favor a broader meaning
of promotion.

The previous section showed that the Tax Court stood on weak
ground in relying on the legislative history to interpret promotion
narrowly. This section goes further and sets forth a more correct
understanding of promotion. Guided by two canons of statutory
interpretation, this Comment suggests that promotion be interpreted
broadly to mean furtherance or encouragement. "o
107 492 F3d 806 (7th Cir 2007).
108 Id at 822.
109 Id.

110 Several early commentators-prior to Textron-appeared to interpret promotion
broadly as well. See, for example, Peter H. Blessing, Privileged Communications in the Context
of U.S. Tax Practice,572 PLIffax 9, 27 (2003) (considering whether promotion requires that the
adviser suggest using a particular transaction, or whether it can include simply advising on the
legality of a transaction).
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a) The presumption that Congress uses the same term consistently
in different statutes. When statutes on the same subject matter contain
similar terms, courts interpreting those statutes should presume that
the terms are used consistently."' This presumption can be overcome
if there is evidence to the contrary, but when the meaning of a term is
unclear from the text of the statute, it is reasonable to start the
interpretive process by looking at how the term is defined in other
statutes. This rule is similar to the "in pari materia" rule that laws on
the same subject matter are to be interpreted with reference to each
other.12

Several provisions of the Code deal specifically with tax shelters.
Many of these provisions define-or at least inform the meaning ofpromotion. These provisions suggest that promotion should be
interpreted broadly to mean any positive encouragement or
assistance. Because the provisions all deal with tax shelters and use
terms similar to promotion, a court should presume that the terms are
used consistently. These other provisions can therefore inform our
understanding of promotion for purposes of § 7525. Countryside
rejected this idea and declined to draw any inference about the
meaning of promotion from these other Code provisions."
First, in 1998-the same year that § 7525 was passed-IRC § 6111
defined a promoter as "any person ...

who participates in the

organization, management, or sale of [a] tax shelter."" Although this
section has since been amended and the definition no longer
remains,"' this shows that in 1998 Congress understood "promotion"
111 Smith v City of Jackson, Mississippi,544 US 228, 233 (2005) ("[W]hen Congress uses the
same language in two statutes having similar purposes ... it is appropriate to presume that
Congress intended that text to have the same meaning in both statutes."). See also Jacob Scott,
Codified Canons and the Common Law of Interpretation,98 Georgetown L J 341, 374-75 (2010)
(discussing the consistent use of one definition across multiple statutes as one of several methods
used to create continuity in the law).
112 See Harris v Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 340 US 106, 107-08 (1950) (applying
the "in parimateria" rule to the estate tax and gift tax); Black's Law Dictionary 791 (West 6th ed
1990) (defining "in pari materia" as "upon the same matter or subject"). The in pari materia
canon depends on the supposition that, when Congress passes related statutes, those statutes were
designed to be harmonious and consistent with each other. Consider Harris,340 US at 107-08.
113 132 Tax Ct at 355 n 8 (declining to use potentially informative definitions of promoter
found in § 6111 and § 6700 because Congress referred solely to § 6662 when § 7525 was passed).
114 IRC § 6111(d) (2000), amended by Gulf Opportunity Zone Act of 2005 § 412(zz), Pub L
No 109-135, 119 Stat 2577, 2641.
115 The prior version of § 6111 required certain tax shelter promoters to register their tax
shelters with the IRS. The current version requires "material advisor[s]" (rather than
"promoters") who assist with "reportable" transactions to report the details of those
transactions. The statute defines a material adviser as "any person who provides any material
aid, assistance, or advice with respect to organizing, managing, promoting, selling, implementing,
insuring, or carrying out any reportable transaction," and who derives income above a certain
amount for her assistance. IRC § 6111(b).
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to include organization and management of tax shelters. Second, IRC
§6700, which is titled "Promoting abusive tax shelters, etc.," imposes
a penalty on anyone who "organizes" or "participates ... in the sale
of" an abusive tax shelter.116 Although the statute does not define
promoting, the title is informative of the content of the statute.'" The
use of the term "[p]romoting" in the title therefore suggests that
organizing or selling a tax shelter for a fee could be considered
promotion.
These two Code provisions suggest that promotion is much more
than selling or marketing. The prior version of § 6111, which defined
promoter, tells us that promotion should include organization,
management, or sale. Section 6700 tells us that promotion should
include participating in the organization or sale of a tax shelter. These
broad definitions indicate that promotion covers the wide array of
activities necessary to implement a tax shelter: creating the shelter
idea, developing the plan, finding participants, marketing, and
coordinating all of the players."' These activities are not limited to the
mass marketing of prepackaged tax shelters. Contrary to the holding in
Countryside, all of these activities can easily be performed in the
context of a long-term relationship. Rather than defining promotion in
terms of the advising relationship, a better definition is furtherance or
encouragement."'

Admittedly, drawing inferences from these two Code provisions
has its weaknesses. Sections 6111 and 6700 use the terms "promoter"
and "promoting," respectively -neither explicitly defines the word
"promotion." Promoting is used in the title of § 6700 rather than in an
in-text definition, and there is no textual evidence in these provisions
that either of the terms was intended to define promotion in other
parts of the Code." Despite these weaknesses, there is still the
116 IRC § 6700(a)(1). Section 6700 is designed to penalize the organizers and promoters of
certain abusive tax shelters. If a promoter makes fraudulent statements regarding the tax
treatment of a transaction or provides tax advice that turns out to cause the taxpayer to "grossly
understate" her tax burden, then the promoter is subject to a fine. See IRC § 6700.
117 See Porterv Nussle, 534 US 516, 527-28 (2002); Almendarez-Torres v United States, 523
US 224, 234 (1998) ("we [ ] note that 'the title of a statute and the heading of a section' are
'tools available for the resolution of a doubt' about the meaning of a statute."), quoting
Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Co, 331 US 519,528-29 (1947).
118 Outside of the Code, promoter often has a broader meaning as well. See, for example,
Robert E. Swanson and Barbara Mardinly Swanson, Tax Shelters: A Guide for Investors and
Their Advisors 7 (Dow Jones-Irwin 1982) (describing the promoter as "the person who puts the
deal together").
11 The district court in Valero made this same point. Valero Energy Corp v United States,
2008 WL 4104368, *17-18 (ND 1Il) (defining promotion in terms of the actions taken rather than
in terms of the relationship between the parties).
120 In fact, the definition of promoter in § 6111 was preceded by the qualifier "For purposes
of [§ 6111(d)] . .. ." IRC § 6111(d)(2) (2000).
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background presumption that the terms are used similarly.'21 Rather
than rely on ambiguous legislative history," Countryside should have
applied this presumption and drawn meaning from these other
provisions. As such, the Tax Court's distinction between promotion
and long-term advising should be rejected.
b) The presumption in favor of disclosure. The narrow reading of

the tax shelter exception should further be rejected because the
Supreme Court held that courts should not restrict the IRS's
summons power'" "absent unambiguous directions from Congress."l24
This direction from the Supreme Court creates a presumption in favor
of disclosure when the scope of privilege is unclear. Because the
United States tax system relies so heavily on the honesty of taxpayers
in reporting their tax liability, the threat of a strong summons power is
essential."n Courts should therefore be slow to adopt broad
interpretations of privilege based only on ambiguous legislative
history.
Countryside violated the presumption in favor of disclosure by
narrowly interpreting an exception to privilege without the required
"unambiguous direction[] from Congress." Section 7525 provided no
clues to the meaning of the term promotion, so the court turned to,
121
and relied on, unclear language from the conference report. Of three
plausible readings of the legislative history," the court inappropriately
chose a reading that severely restricted the IRS's summons power
based on the length or quality of the tax-advising relationship.

See note 111.
Many scholars and judges have argued that relying on legislative history should be
disfavored generally because the history can often be read any way the court wants to read it.
See, for example, Frank H. Easterbrook, JudicialDiscretion in Statutory Interpretation,57 Okla
L Rev 1, 18 (2004) (quoting Judge Harold Leventhal as stating that "legislative history is like
looking over the crowd at a cocktail party and picking out your friends"); Frank H. Easterbrook,
What Does Legislative History Tell Us?, 66 Chi Kent L Rev 441, 446-47 (1990).
123 See IRC §7602 (authorizing the IRS to examine documents and summon witnesses to
determine the accuracy of a return or collect an amount owed).
124 United States v Arthur Young & Co, 465 US 805, 816 (1984) (justifying the need for
explicit congressional direction for limitations on the IRS's summons power on the grounds that
this power was essential to ensure that the national tax burden is distributed fairly and
equitably). See also United States v First Bank, 737 F2d 269, 273 (2d Cir 1984). The Seventh
Circuit made this point in Valero when it noted that Valero's position was at odds with the
"IRS's broad summons power." 569 F3d at 633, citing IRC § 7602(a). The court then determined
that the word "promotion" was "not a clear enough signal" to limit the tax shelter exception to
mass-marketed shelters. Valero, 569 F3d at 633.
125 See Arthur Young, 465 US at 815-17.
126 See text accompanying notes 86-87.
127 See Part III.A.1.
121

122
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For these reasons, the distinction between promotion and longterm advising relationships should be rejected.ln The legislative
history does not compel (or even necessarily suggest) such a result.
When courts are faced with deciding whether there was promotion of
a tax shelter, they should not give weight to the length of the advising
relationship. Until there is "unambiguous" direction to the contrary,
courts should read promotion broadly to mean furtherance or
encouragement, as suggested by similar uses of promoter and
promoting in the Code.129
B.

Narrowing Valero's Broad View of "Tax Shelter"

Countryside may have been correct to follow the conference
report and in trying to limit the scope of the exception so that routine
planning was not covered, but, as shown above, the court was
incorrect to place limits on the word "promotion." The court could
have reached a proper (and possibly identical") result by focusing
instead on the definition of tax shelter. Valero took a broad view of
tax shelter, and this section argues that this view should be narrowed.
This section proposes an understanding of the § 6662 tax shelter
definition that will not result in the exception swallowing the rule. The
limitations focus on the meaning of the phrase "significant purpose."
Part III.B.1 discusses problems with the Seventh Circuit's application
of the § 6662 definition. Part III.B.2 proposes a new standard based
on Treasury regulations.

128 One of the strongest arguments supporting Countryside was not even raised in the
opinion. It was suggested in the Valero taxpayer's briefs. Brief for Appellant Valero Energy
Corporation, Valero Energy Corp v United States, No 08-3473, *37 (7th Cir filed Nov 12, 2008)
(available on Westlaw at 2008 WL 5789493). The argument is that promotion is a term of art
meaning "sale" when discussing tax shelters. See Jeremiah Coder, Seventh Circuit Upholds
Broad Shelter Promotion Exception, 123 Tax Notes 1399, 1401-02 (2009). See also Beale, 25 Va
Tax Rev at 596-97 (cited in note 25) (arguing that the abusive practices of inside advisers are no
different from those of outside marketers, but frequently associating the term "promoter" with
the latter rather than the former). While this argument may have some merit, its weaknesses are
that (1) there is still no textual support for that kind of limitation, and (2) there are instances in
which promotion or promoter is not restricted to sales. See note 118.
129 This definition of promotion is consistent with a definition of promoter that the Tax
Court has applied for purposes of determining good-faith reliance on tax advice. Section 6662 is
an underpayment penalty provision, see note 69, but the taxpayer may avoid the penalty if he
had good cause for the underpayment. IRC § 6664(c). Good-faith reliance on professional tax
advice may be good cause for underpayment, but taxpayers generally may not rely, even in good
faith, on advice from a promoter. See Tigers Eye Trading, LLC v Commissioner of Internal
Revenue, 97 Tax Ct Mem Dec (CCH) 1622, 1633-34 (2009). In this context, the Tax Court has
defined a promoter as "an adviser who participated in structuring the transaction or is otherwise
related to, has an interest in, or profits from the transaction." Id.
130 See text accompanying notes 183-84.
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1. The vague significant-purpose tax shelter definition.
Recall that a tax shelter is defined essentially as any transaction
with a significant purpose of tax avoidance."' This definition seems to
depend only on the apparent motives for the transaction and makes
no mention of the underlying substance or of whether the attempted
tax avoidance is consistent with the Code or with congressional intent.
On its face, then, the tax shelter exception appears to reach legitimate
tax planning, as long as tax avoidance was a significant purpose.13
From the year of its passage, the significant purpose definition has
been regularly criticized as vaguem and overbroad." Several
academics have called for Congress and the Treasury to provide
additional guidance, and a few have proposed more concrete
interpretations of the phrase.13' Nevertheless, the definition of
significant purpose remains unclear.
See text accompanying notes 69-70.
Recall that § 7525 references the § 6662 definition of "tax shelter."
133 See, for example, Shane Jasmine Young, Note, Pierce the Privilege or Give 'Em Shelter?
The Applicability of Privilege in Tax Shelter Cases, 5 Nev L J 767, 792-93 (2005) (cautioning that,
due to the broad tax shelter definition, it is "ill-advised" for tax practitioners to rely on the
§ 7525 privilege).
134 See, for example, AICPA, AICPA Comments on Regs Regarding Changes to Circular
230, 2004 Tax Notes Today 32-29,1 14 (Feb 18, 2004) (urging the IRS to amend the definition of
tax shelter in a Treasury regulation because it relied on the § 6662(d) definition, which the
AICPA contended "lacks clear definition, is overly-broad, and may result in inconsistent
administration or enforcement"); Burgess J.W. Raby and William L. Raby, Penalty Protection
for the Taxpayer: Circular230 and the Code, 107 Tax Notes 1257, 1258 (2005) ("Getting married
on December 31, 2005, rather than January 1, 2006, might be viewed as having a significant
purpose of tax avoidance by some people and in some circumstances."). But see Johnson, 80 Tax
Notes at 1610-11 (cited in note 70) (arguing that a broad significant-purpose test is essential due
to the creativity of tax planners and the complexity of the structures they design). Several of
these commentators are actually discussing the significant-purpose definition found in Circular
230. See 31 CFR § 10.35(b)(2)(i)(C). This ethics rule uses language very similar to that in § 6662,
and commentators frequently discuss them together. Neither the IRS nor courts have explained
the meaning of the significant-purpose definition for purposes of Circular 230. See note 136.
135 For example, two commentators suggested that if a transaction is motivated anywhere
from 5 to 33 percent by the tax considerations, then those considerations were a significant
purpose. See Jordan P. Weiss and Raffi S. Baroutjian, A New Standard for Corporate Tax
Shelters, 22 LA Law 26, 27 (Sept 1999). Another commentator uses a method similar to the one
proposed in this Comment. See Nathan W. Giesselman, A Significant Problem Defining a
"Significant Purpose" and the Significant Difficulties That Result, 111 Tax Notes 1119, 1124-28
(2006) (looking at four regulations, including the regulations enacted pursuant to § 6111, to
suggest a limited meaning of significant purpose). Giesselman concludes that the regulations do
not provide a satisfactory definition. Id at 1129-30.
136 Letter from the New York State Bar Association Tax Section to the Chairmen and
Ranking Members of the Senate Finance Committee and House Ways and Means Committee
*10 & n 25 (Sept 22, 2009), online at http://www.nysba.org/AM/Template.cfm?Section=
Tax Section_Reports_2009&TEMPLATE=/CM/ContentDisplay.cfm&CONTENTID=32062
(visited Jan 25, 2011) ("[W]hatever limitations may exist on the 'significant purpose tax shelter'
concept have not yet been clearly articulated."); Giesselman, 111 Tax Notes at 1120, 1123 (cited
131

132
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Valero is incomplete, because it fails to establish proper limits on
the significant-purpose definition." The Seventh Circuit conceded
that, under its analysis, the exception "could ...

include some

legitimate attempts by a company to reduce its tax burden.", The
district court gave no serious consideration to whether the claimed
benefits were acceptable, basing its decision almost solely on the
apparent motivations for performing the transactions." At trial,
Valero argued that the claimed tax benefits were proper, so the
transaction could not properly be considered a tax shelter. The court
dismissed this argument: "Valero focuses its argument on why the
transactions at issue had legitimate business purposes, rather than
trying to explain how or why tax avoidance was not a significant
purpose of those transactions."" In other words, the court did not

care about the possibility that the transaction had a business purpose
and that the claimed tax benefits might actually be consistent with the
Code. The court briefly mentioned the potential impropriety of the
claimed benefits, then simply concluded that, "at a minimum," tax
avoidance was a significant purpose."' According to one practitioner,
"[t]he court missed an opportunity to impose a meaningful
standard."14 2 If other courts follow this example, the tax shelter
exception could swallow almost all of the privilege. In other words, if
courts ask only whether the taxpayer sought to reduce his tax burden,
and fail to consider whether those tax benefits are proper, then almost
all tax planning documents will be available to the IRS in discovery.

in note 135). See also Raby and Raby, 107 Tax Notes at 1257-58 (cited in note 134); Edward M.
Polansky, Texas CPA Group Voices Support for Proposed Circular230 Regs., 2010 Tax Notes
Today 195-15 (Oct 8, 2010) (explaining that the IRS has given no guidance on the meaning of
the significant-purpose language).
137 J.P. Finet, Alison Bennett, and Melinda Hanson, Seventh Circuit Adopts Expansive
Definition of "Promotea Tax Shelter" in Privilege Case, 77 USLW 1806, 1807-08 (2009) (quoting
several tax practitioners opining that Valero significantly broadens the exception in a way that can
be applied to lots of planning). But see Gregory M. Fowler, The Valero Cases: New Meaningfor
"Significant Purpose" Definition?, 2008 Tax Notes Today 219-28 (Nov 12, 2008) (arguing that
Valero opens the door for the business purpose test to be considered as part of the § 6662
definition).
138 Valero, 569 F3d at 632.
139 See Valero, 2008 WL 4104368 at *15-16.
140 Id at *15.
141 Id at *16.
142 Jeremiah Coder, Court Finds Shelter Exception to Tax PractitionerPrivilege, 120 Tax
Notes 627, 629 (2008) (describing a tax practitioner's concern that "applying the court's analysis
means that virtually any transaction with significant income tax consequences-such as setting
up IRAs or buying a house-meets the technical definition of a tax shelter").
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2. A proposed standard based on Treasury regulations.
The Treasury Department has broad authority to issue
interpretive regulations necessary for administering the complex tax
system.'43 The Supreme Court recently affirmed that courts should
apply Chevron deference to these regulations,'" so there is no
question that the Treasury regulations are authoritative. Two
regulations suggest that the tax shelter definition in § 6662 does not
include routine and customized tax planning, even if tax
considerations motivated the transaction. Part of this Comment's
proposed test is derived from old regulations under § 6662 that
explain what it means for a transaction to have a "principal purpose"
of tax avoidance. The bulk of the test is derived from the regulations
under § 6111, which used to contain nearly identical significantpurpose language to that currently found in § 6662. It is important to
emphasize that neither of these regulations is a perfect guide for
interpreting the § 6662 definition.
First, we look to the regulations for § 6662. Treasury Regulation
§ 1.6662-4 interprets the definition of tax shelter given in § 6662.'"
This regulation, however, has not been updated to reflect changes
made to the statute in 1997. Prior to 1997, § 6662 used the phrase
"principal purpose" instead of "significant purpose"-a tax shelter
was any plan or transaction with a "principal purpose" of avoiding
income t
Although Regulation § 1.6662-4 interprets the meaning
of principal purpose rather than significant purpose, the limits it
places on the principal-purpose tax shelter definition are informative:
The principal purpose of an entity, plan or arrangement is not to
avoid or evade Federal income tax if the entity, plan or
arrangement has as its purpose the claiming of exclusions from
income, accelerated deductions or other tax benefits in a manner
consistent with the statute and Congressionalpurpose.

143 IRC § 7805(a) ("[T]he Secretary shall prescribe all needful rules and regulations for the
enforcement of [the Code].").
144 Mayo Foundationfor Medical Education and Research v United States, 131 S Ct 704, 713
(2011) ("The principles underlying our decision in Chevron apply with full force in the tax
context.").
145 Other commentators have looked to these and other regulations to suggest roughly
similar limits on the definition. See note 135.
2
146 See Treas Reg § 1.6662-4(g)( ) (elaborating on the "principal purpose" tax shelter
definition).
147 IRC § 6662(d) (1994), amended by Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997 § 1028(c)(2), Pub L No
105-34, 111 Stat 788, 928.
148 Treas Reg § 1.6662-4(g)(2)(ii) (emphasis added).
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The regulation goes on to carve out several types of transactions
that are motivated solely by their tax benefits but are not tax shelters
because the tax benefits comport with congressional intent. A few of
these include purchasing municipal bonds with tax-exempt interest,
taking the maximum allowable depreciation deductions under the
Code, choosing to deduct intangible drilling and development costs as
permitted by statute, establishing a tax-favored retirement plan, and
choosing to be taxed as a pass-through entity to escape the doublelayered tax for corporations. "9 In short, this Regulation created a safe
harbor for tax planning decisions that were perfectly consistent with
the Code and congressional purpose, even though arguably all of the
examples listed are activities that would be done for the principal
purpose of avoiding taxes.
The existence of this safe harbor under the old definition
provides support for the judicial creation of a similar safe harbor
under the new definition. Although the change from principal
purpose to significant purpose was probably intended to cast a wider
net, there is no reason to think that this kind of safe harbor should no
longer exist. If a judge can tell that certain claimed tax benefits are
consistent with the Code and congressional purpose, then there is no
benefit to allowing discovery of the associated planning documents.
Imagine two transactions, X and Y. Transaction X is motivated 90
percent (principally) by its tax benefits, and transaction Y is motivated
30 percent (significantly) by its tax benefits. For both transactions, the
tax benefits are consistent with the Code and with congressional
purpose. Under the safe harbor in the outdated regulations,
transaction X would not be a tax shelter. Without a similar limitation,
transaction Y would be a tax shelter under amended § 6662(d). It
would be absurd, however, to suggest that the Treasury would subject
transaction Y to stricter scrutiny and greater penalties than
transaction X-the tax considerations were greater in transaction X
than in transaction Y.m So the first limitation from the regulations is
that the significant-purpose requirement is not satisfied if the claimed
benefits are consistent with the Code and with congressional purpose.
The second limitation comes from the regulations under § 6111.
The 1997 change from principal to significant was intended by
Congress to make the § 6662 definition consistent with the newly
created tax shelter definition in § 6111(d)(1). The conference report
explains: "This modification conforms the definition of tax shelter for
Treas Reg § 1.6662-4(g)(2)(ii).
See Kip Dellinger, The Proposed, New and Improved Tax Preparer Standard: Will
Tragedy Become Farce?, 119 Tax Notes 867, 871 (2008).
151 See id at 869.
149
150
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purposes of the substantial understatement penalty to the definition
of tax shelter for purposes of these new confidential corporate tax
shelter registration requirements." 52 The definition of tax shelter in
§ 6111 at that time" was more detailed than the definition in § 6662,"
but both definitions had the significant-purpose requirement in 1997.
Treasury Regulation § 301.6111-2(b) gives specific guidance on the
meaning of the significant-purpose requirement in § 6111." Because
the § 6662 definition was changed to make it "conform" to the § 6111
definition, and given the lack of guidance under the regulations for
§ 6111, a court interpreting the meaning of significant purpose should
look to these specifications in Regulation § 301.6111-2(b).'
Under Regulation § 301.6111-2(b), there are two ways that a
transaction may have tax avoidance as a significant purpose. First, the
significant-purpose requirement of the old § 6111(d) tax shelter
definition is met if the transaction is one of many "listed transactions"
previously identified by the IRS as tax-avoidance transactions." This
widely available list contains transactions known to be highly abusive,
many of which were once marketed heavily.l" Examples of such
transactions include lease-in, lease-out transactions; debt straddles;
and abusive Roth IRA transactions. 5 9
Second, the significant-purpose requirement is met if the tax
adviser "reasonably expects the transaction to be presented in the
same or substantially similar form to more than one potential

152 Revenue Reconciliation Act of 1997, HR Rep No 105-148, 105th Cong, 1st Sess 471
(1997), reprinted in 1997 USCCAN 678, 865.
153 Section 6111 was amended in 2004. See American Jobs Creation Act of 2004 § 815(a),
Pub L No 108-357, 118 Stat 1418, 1518, codified as amended at IRC § 6111. The significantpurpose language is no longer used.
154 Section 6111 contained additional
requirements regarding promoter fees and
confidentiality agreements. See IRC § 6111 (1994 & Supp 1997).
1ss See Treas Reg § 301.6111-2(b).
156 It should be noted that the guidance accompanying the temporary regulation that
preceded Regulation § 301.6111-2 specifically stated that the Regulation did not apply to the tax
shelter definition in § 6662. IRS, Corporate Tax Shelter Registration Temporary Regulation, 65
Fed Reg 11215, 11215, 11217-18 (2000). No similar limitation exists in the text of the Regulation
itself. See Treas Reg § 301.6111-2. See also BDO Seidman, 492 F3d at 825 (stating that the
regulations for § 6111 are of little relevance to interpreting § 6662). In that case, the taxpayer
argued that the regulations for § 6111 limited the § 6662 definition to C corporations, even
though no such limiting language existed in the text of § 6662. Id. The argument for giving
weight to the § 6111 regulations is stronger here where we are interpreting the significantpurpose language shared by the two statutes.
157 See Treas Reg § 301.6111-2(b)(2).
158 See IRS, Listed Transactions-LB&I Tier I Issues (cited in note 23) (listing thirty-four
potentially abusive transactions).

159 See id.
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participant."" The regulation explains that "substantially similar" is
to be "broadly construed."' It includes "any transaction that is
expected to obtain the same or similar types of tax consequences and
that is either factually similar or based on the same or similar tax
strategy.'"" Because so many tax advisers serve multiple clients and

help all of them reduce their tax burdens, it is important to consider at
what point two transactions are substantially similar and therefore
would fall under this prong of the tax shelter definition. Although the
question whether a transaction will be presented in substantially
similar form to other taxpayers may be slightly more complex," this
Comment proposes a few of the factors that courts should consider
when deciding whether tax advice is customized, as opposed to advice
that is likely to be presented in substantially similar form to multiple
taxpayers.
Factors indicating that advice is customized (or is advice that is
not expected to be presented to multiple participants in substantially
similar form) include: (1) the advice was given in response to a
specific request by the taxpayer; (2) the advice was designed to reduce
the tax burden for a transaction that will go forward independent of
the ultimate tax consequences; and (3) the existence of a valid-and
relatively unique-business purpose." Factors indicating that advice
160 Treas Reg § 301.6111-2(b)(3). Under this second prong, the tax benefits must constitute
an "important part of the intended results of the transaction." Treas Reg § 301.6111-2(b)(3).
This requirement is not a significant limitation-tax considerations are a serious aspect any time
a tax adviser is consulted. This Comment therefore ignores this element.
The Regulation also exempts from this provision transactions for which the promoter or
adviser reasonably determines that: (1) the taxpayer will likely "participate in the transaction in the
ordinary course of its business in a form consistent with customary commercial practice," and
(2) "[tlhere is a generally accepted understanding that the expected Federal income tax benefits ...
are properly allowable under the Internal Revenue Code." Treas Reg § 301.6111-2(b)(3). As noted
above, the old regulations for § 6662 exempted tax benefits that are consistent with the Code and
congressional purpose. See text accompanying note 148. This two-part exception serves essentially
the same role-it exempts transactions that are readily apparent as accepted tax planning. For
purposes of articulating a standard, this exception will therefore be ignored.
161 Treas Reg § 301.6111-2(a)(3).
162 Treas Reg § 301.6111-2(a)(3). For more details regarding the meaning of substantially
similar and for examples of the application of the term, see Treas Reg § 1.6011-4(c)(4).
163 Several commentators have noted the difficulty of making this determination. See, for
example, Sarah B. Lawsky, Probably? Understanding Tax Law's Uncertainty, 157 U Pa L Rev
1017, 1040-41 (2009) (concluding that the definition of substantially similar is deliberately vague
in order to preserve the ability of the IRS to make individual judgments regarding the status of
specific transactions). Some have criticized the definition of "substantially similar" as vague and
overbroad. See Joshua D. Blank, Overcoming Overdisclosure:Toward Tax Shelter Detection, 56
UCLA L Rev 1629, 1657-58 (2009) (explaining that substantially similar might really be better
understood as just similar).
164 When a taxpayer has a preexisting and valid business purpose, he typically consults a tax
adviser on ways to achieve that business purpose in a tax-efficient manner. To the extent that his
business purpose is unique, the advice is likely to be unique. Furthermore, transactions with a
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is not customized include: (1) the advice was based on a generic
prototype; " (2) the advice can be used by almost any taxpayer,
regardless of the taxpayer's unique economic situation; (3) the adviser
made only "subtle and insignificant changes" to a transaction that was
presented to another taxpayer;'" and (4) the advice is currently, or has
been, mass marketed. If a court considers these factors and concludes
that the transaction in question is likely to be presented in
substantially similar form to more than one participant (as opposed to
being customized advice), then the transaction does not satisfy the
significant purpose requirement in the regulation and is not a tax
shelter under the § 6662 definition. 67
The regulations under the old § 6662 definition suggest that there
should be an exception for tax planning that is consistent with the Code
and congressional purpose. The regulations for the old § 6111 definition
suggest that significant purpose includes only (1) listed transactions and
(2) transactions that are presented to multiple participants in
substantially similar form. These limits should carry over into courts'
analysis of the tax shelter definition in § 6662(d).'" Because this
definition is incorporated into § 7525(b), these limitations will help to
ensure that the tax shelter exception does not swallow the rule.
The test articulated above does not include nonlisted-but highly
abusive-customized tax advice. Realities of the "cat and mouse"
nature of the anti-abuse efforts by the IRS make another prong for
the test necessary. There is often a lag between the time an abusive
valid business purpose are those most likely to be upheld, so there is little to be gained by
labeling such transactions as tax shelters. The existence of a business purpose should thus cut in
favor of finding that advice is customized.
165 Consider Countryside, 132 Tax Ct at 352-53 (noting that Egan's advice was not based on
a generic prototype maintained by his firm).
166 See Modification of Tax Shelter Rule III, TD 9000, 2002-2 Cumulative Bull 87, 88.
When the Treasury described the new definition of substantially similar, it explained that its
purpose was to prevent taxpayers from trying to evade reporting requirements by making only
minor changes to listed transactions and then claiming that they were not, in fact, listed
transactions. Id ("[Slome taxpayers and promoters have made subtle and insignificant changes
to a listed transaction in order to claim that their transactions are not subject to disclosure.").
167 A recent tax court opinion recognized the significance of whether advice is customized
or marketed. In 106 Ltd v Commissionerof Internal Revenue, 2011 WL 80446 (Tax Ct), the court
considered the meaning of promoter in determining good-faith reliance for the § 6664(c)
understatement penalty exception. Id at *6-9. The court noted both the broad definition of
promoter from Tigers Eye Trading, LLC v Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 97 Tax Ct Mem
Dec (CCH) 1622 (2009), see note 129, and the narrow, relationship-based definition of promoter
from Countryside. The court determined that the broader definition from Tigers Eye was
appropriate for good-faith reliance cases where "the transaction involved is the same tax shelter
offered to numerous parties." 106 Ltd, 2011 WL 80446 at *27-28. The court thus implied that
where tax advice was not marketed, Countryside's narrower, relationship-based definition of
promoter might be more appropriate. See id.
168 See text accompanying notes 150-56.

The University of Chicago Law Review

698

[78:671

transaction begins to be utilized and the time that the IRS lists that
transaction." The IRS is always trying to keep up with cutting edge
tax planning, and tax advisers are always looking for new ways to save
their clients money. For this reason, the § 6662 tax shelter definitionand by extension, the tax shelter exception-should also apply if the
judge can easily tell that the claimed tax benefits are unmistakably
inconsistent with the Code and with congressional purpose. This may
be thought of as a safety valve, allowing a court to find that the tax
shelter definition is satisfied for especially egregious tax planning that
does not (yet) meet the formal requirements of the rules in the
regulations.
The judge would have to be able to make this determination
early on in litigation proceedings, before the court has had a chance to
fully investigate all of the details. Because this test will be used to rule
on a privilege claim, it must remain relatively simple to administer,
and it should not depend on the ultimate merits of the case."o Thus,
this aspect of the test comes into effect only where the judge can
easily make this determination early on, when the privilege questions
arise. When tax planning is so abusive that the judge can easily see
that it is inconsistent with congressional purpose, the significantpurpose definition will be satisfied, regardless of whether the
transaction is listed or the advice is customized."'
This third element, combined with aspects gleaned from the two
Treasury regulations, creates a robust test for the definition of tax
shelter. The test can be articulated as follows:
A transaction will satisfy the § 6662(d) tax shelter definitionand therefore be a tax shelter for purposes of § 7525(b)-if it is
(1) a listed transaction, or (2) the tax adviser reasonably expects
to present the same or a substantially similar transaction to at
least one other taxpayer, or (3) the judge can identify the
transaction as clearly abusive without a rigorous examination of
all of the facts. The definition will not be satisfied if a judge can

See, for example, S Prt No 108-34 at 7 (cited in note 28).
See United States v BDO Seidman, LLP, 2005 WL 742642, *9 (ND II) (recognizing the
difficulty of making early determinations on whether a transaction is a tax shelter).
171 Importantly, this "safety valve" may be easier to administer due to the huge lag between
audits and litigation. For instance, in 2010 a taxpayer may engage in an egregious transaction. It
may not get audited until 2012, and litigation may not start until 2014. In that time, the
transaction may have become a listed transaction or commentary on the transaction may note its
egregious nature. It therefore might not be so hard for a court to make such a determination.
For example, the transactions in Countryside took place in 2000, and the IRS first officially
challenged the distributions in 2004. Countryside v Commissionerof Internal Revenue, 95 Tax Ct
Mem Dec (CCH) 1006, 1007-08 (2008).
169
170
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readily determine that the claimed tax benefits are consistent
with the Code and with congressional purpose.m
Although one might question the validity of combining these
regulations, some clear line must be drawn if tax advisers are to derive
any benefit from the privilege."' This line has the benefit of being
good policy by targeting the most abusive types of tax planning and, at
the same time, retaining a meaningful and predictable privilege. It
targets the most abusive practices by disfavoring listed transactions
and generic advice. The listed transactions have already been
identified by the IRS as potentially abusive,174 so there is no question
that the goals of the tax shelter exception are being furthered by
reaching them. Furthermore, in the aggregate, generic advice may be
more abusive than customized advice due to the sheer volume of
taxpayers that can be reached through mass marketing."'
Furthermore, this definition of significant purpose would allow
the tax shelter exception to focus on the types of abusive practices
specifically occurring in the late 1990s. The mass market for corporate
tax shelters was at its peak at this time."' It is reasonable to assume
that a major goal of the creation of the tax shelter exception was to
ensure that the creation of the privilege did not hinder the IRS's
efforts to combat this mass market for abusive transactions. Under the
proposed test, the tax shelter exception would satisfy this goal by
reaching all marketed tax shelters (unless a judge determined that the
tax benefits were consistent with the Code and congressional intent).
This Comment's test for the significant-purpose definition of tax
shelter should be adopted and applied to the § 7525(b) privilege
exception because it is relatively simple to apply, it is predictable, and
172 This test resembles Countryside's rule shielding communications from long-term
advisers giving custom advice, but this test is more robust. Like the Countryside rule, this test
exempts a great deal of customized advice from the tax shelter exception. Consider Countryside,
132 Tax Ct at 354-55 (noting that the advice from Egan was given in response to a specific
request and as part of an ongoing relationship). This new test, however, includes a bright-line
rule that does not privilege advice regarding listed transactions and transactions that are clearly
abusive, regardless of the length or quality of the advising relationship.
173 See note 16.
174 See note 23.
175 S Rep No 108-34 at 57 (cited in note 28) (describing KPMG's marketing tactics and
ability to make contacts across the country). It is true that customized advice can be highly
abusive. See Beale, 25 Va Tax Rev at 596-97 (cited in note 25). The test for the tax shelter
exception, however, must be easy to administer early in litigation. Any test that regularly
considered customized advice would probably have to look in great detail at the overall merits of
the transactions, and it would be difficult to predict with any certainty the outcome of any
particular privilege claim. This Comment's proposed test allows some customized abusive
practices to retain privilege-but only those that are not clearly abusive-so that it can be
administered predictably.
176 See S Prt No 108-34 at 4 (cited in note 28).
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it targets the most abusive types of planning." The district court in
Valero rejected this more nuanced approach, concluding that the
government need not make any showing regarding the substance of
the transactions to satisfy the significant-purpose definition."' That
approach should be rejected. This would allow courts to ensure that
the § 6662 definition-and by extension, the § 7525(b) exception-is
not applied to routine and customized tax planning.
C.

Summary and Application: What Is Tax Shelter Promotion?

This section summarizes the Comment's assertions by setting
forth the method that courts should follow to determine whether
there was promotion of participation in a tax shelter. First, the judge
must ask whether there was promotion. The relevant question is
whether, in the communications at issue, the tax practitioner
encouraged or facilitated the taxpayer's efforts to participate in the
alleged tax shelters. This requirement will be satisfied any time a tax
professional helps a taxpayer plan or carry out a transactionconsequently, this is often a very easy standard to meet. The length of
the advising relationship, and whether the advice was custom tailored
(as opposed to generic and prepackaged), will not factor into this
initial question.
Second, if there was promotion, the judge should examine the
substance of the transactions to see whether they fall within
§ 6662(d)'s definition of tax shelter. This depends on whether a
177 Furthermore, this limiting approach is consistent with the way that most courts have
dealt with the § 6662 tax shelter definition. As stated above, no court has explained the meaning
of significant purpose, see note 136 and accompanying text, but courts have established a pattern
of finding a significant purpose only where the tax shelter was abusive. Although on its face the
§ 6662 definition deals only with motives, courts have often also looked at the underlying
substance of the transaction when concluding that it was a tax shelter. See, for example, Jade
Trading, LLC v United States, 80 Fed Cl 11, 57 (2007) ("[A]n objective scrutiny of the spread
transaction contributed to Jade leads ineluctably to the conclusion that the spread transaction
wholly lacked economic reality and concomitantly that tax avoidance was a significant purpose
of this transaction."); Santa Monica Pictures, LLC v Commissionerof Internal Revenue, 89 Tax
Ct Mem Dec (CCH) 1157, 1229 (2005) ("We have concluded that the transaction ... had no
economic substance, its only purpose being to transfer built-in tax losses in exchange for a $10
million cash payment. Consequently, this arrangement is considered a 'tax shelter' for purposes
of section 6662(d)(2)(C)(iii)."). This pattern shows that (lack of) substance often matters-the
courts did not simply ask whether tax avoidance was a "significant" motivation. Two opinions
seem to have concluded that the definition was satisfied based only on the taxpayer's
motivations, but their exact reasoning is unclear. See Enbridge Energy Co v United States, 354
Fed Appx 15, 22 (5th Cir 2009) (holding that the taxpayer could not avoid § 6662 penalties
because the transaction was "motivated solely by the avoidance of taxes"); Doe v Wachovia
Corp, 268 F Supp 2d 627, 637 (WD NC 2003) (holding that the § 7525 privilege did not apply
because "the tax opinion sold to the Plaintiffs clearly shows the transaction was designed to be a
tax advantaged structure").
178 See text accompanying notes 137-42.
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significant purpose of the transactions was to avoid or evade income
taxes. Because no clear definition of significant purpose has been
articulated by the courts, this Comment has proposed a test based
roughly on the Treasury regulations, as discussed in Part III.B.2.
Applying that test, a judge would first ask whether the transaction is
consistent with the Code and congressional intent (without delving
too deeply into the disputed or unclear facts). If it is, then the
transaction is not a tax shelter. But if it is not, or if this determination
cannot be made, then the judge should determine whether the
transaction is a listed transaction. If so, then it is a tax shelter. If not,
then the judge should ask whether the advice is generic advice that
will reasonably be presented in the same or substantially similar form
to at least one other taxpayer. If so, then the transaction is a tax
shelter. If, after applying this standard, the judge determines that the
tax shelter definition is not satisfied, then the § 7525 privilege may
protect the communications because the adviser was not engaged in
tax shelter promotion. 79
Even though this Comment attempts to create a test that is easy
to administer, application of the test will be difficult because a judge
must rule on claims of privilege in the early stages of litigation."
Whether a given transaction was an abusive tax shelter is often the
ultimate question in the case. This aspect of early decisionmaking is,
of course, not a new problem. The crime-fraud exception to the
attorney-client privilege pierces the privilege for communications
made for the purpose of assisting the client to engage in fraud or to
commit a crime, and judges must make decisions on these matters
prior to the ultimate disposition of the case.m' For procedural details

179 Because the tax practitioner privilege adopts the same protections of the common law
attorney-client privilege, the crime-fraud exception applies when analyzing the tax practitioner
privilege. See BDO Seidman, 492 F3d at 822; text accompanying note 51. Because Congress is
presumed not to have created a superfluous exception in § 7525(b), we would expect a correct
interpretation of the tax shelter exception to apply to certain kinds of aggressive tax planning
that are not reached by the crime-fraud exception.
This Comment's interpretation preserves such a distinction. Former IRS Chief Counsel John
Williams stated that aggressive tax planning and mass-marketed tax shelters would "rarely, if ever,"
rise to the level of tax advice that would be subject to the crime-fraud exception. John B. Williams,
Speech to NYSBA Tax Section Meeting, 2003 Tax Notes Today 15-20, M 9-23 (Jan 23, 2003). But
see BDO Seidman, 492 F3d at 818 (applying a broader standard than that advocated by Chief
Counsel Williams and finding that advice regarding mass-marketed tax shelters could fall under the
crime-fraud exception). Predicting the exact amount of overlap between the two exceptions is
difficult, because application of the crime-fraud exception is not entirely consistent. See William H.
Volz and Theresa Ellis, An Attorney-Client Privilegefor Embattled Tax Practitioners:A Legislative
Response to Uncertain Legal Counsel, 38 Hofstra L Rev 213, 225-26(2009).

180 See note 170.

181 See In re Antitrust Grand Jury, 805 F2d 155,164 (6th Cir 1986).
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and burdens of proof, courts should apply the tax shelter exception in
the same way they apply the crime-fraud exception."
Nonetheless, because the question will arise long before a judge
would normally rule on the merits, the result may ultimately hinge on
the judge's early intuitions about the transactions. Thus, the tax
shelter exception may yet encompass some legitimate planning. But,
under this Comment's proposed test, the exception will generally not
conflict with planning that is customized or is so routine that the judge
can readily identify it as nonabusive. Until the § 6662 significantpurpose language is clarified, either by amending the Code or through
new Treasury regulations, this is the best that courts can do.
It is illustrative to consider how this method would have applied in
Countryside and Valero. If this test had been applied in Countryside,

there is a strong possibility that the court would have arrived at the
same result, but in a much different way. There was "promotion"
because Egan helped arrange the transactions. The court would have
moved on to consider whether the transaction was a tax shelter under
the § 6662(d) definition. The transactions in Countryside were not
listed transactions, and they were neither clearly inconsistent nor
clearly consistent with the Code and congressional intent.'m The court
commented on whether the advice was customized:
[Egan] did not rely on any generic prototypes, descriptive
materials, or files maintained by [PricewaterhouseCoopers
(PWC)]. He had recourse to tax specialists in the PWC national
office in Washington, D.C., who help[ed] him understand
complex provisions of the Internal Revenue Code and associated
regulations, but he received from them no descriptive materials
regarding the tax structure in issue here."
The court was therefore convinced that this advice was not the type
that would reasonably be presented in substantially similar form to
multiple taxpayers. Furthermore, almost one year earlier, the same
judge had determined that Countryside's liquidating transactions had
182 See BDO Seidman, 492 F3d at 822 (using this approach). The party seeking to abrogate
the privilege must show some foundation in fact that the exception applies. The court will then
request a response or explanation from the party seeking privilege regarding why the privilege
should still apply. Id. The process frequently involves in camera review of the challenged
documents. The required standard of proof may vary, but generally a preponderance of the
evidence standard is used if the documents are reviewed in camera. See Christopher B. Mueller
and Laird C. Kirkpatrick, Evidence § 5.22 at 370-71 (Aspen 4th ed 2009). See also notes 51, 179,
and accompanying text.
183 Although one year earlier the judge had upheld certain aspects of the transaction, the
IRS raised other challenges to the transactions that were proceeding in other courts. See
Countryside, 95 Tax Ct Mem Dec (CCH) at 1014.
184 Countryside, 132 Tax Ct at 352-53.
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a business purpose." The fact that the transactions had a real business
purpose and the advice was given at the taxpayer's request
strengthens the claim that the advice was customized. Thus, the court
would likely have determined that the tax shelter exception did not
apply because the transaction in question was not a tax shelter under
the § 6662 "significant purpose" definition.
In Valero, the Seventh Circuit properly concluded that there was
promotion. The court affirmed the district court's decision that the
transaction was a tax shelter-yet this decision did not carefully
consider the substance of the transaction." Had the court applied this
Comment's proposed test for the definition of tax shelter, the court
might have determined that the transaction was clearly abusive.
Although this was not a listed transaction, the court considered
evidence that it might in fact be very abusive. The court criticized all
four of the purported business purposes put forth by the taxpayer, and
evidence suggested that the business purposes were manufactured to
attract less attention from the IRS." If the court could have
determined that the transaction was obviously abusive, then it would
have found that the tax shelter exception applied. Alternatively, the
court could have found that the tax shelter exception applied if the tax
advice was expected to be presented to multiple taxpayers. There was
some evidence that the advice was not customized and that a similar
strategy had been used by other Arthur Andersen clients." Under
this Comment's proposed test, the court would have had to consider
this evidence more carefully.
CONCLUSION

The value of the tax practitioner privilege will be severely limited
until taxpayers and their advisers can predict how the privilege will
apply in long-term advising relationships. Courts should ignore the
length of the advising relationship, and should read promotion
broadly to mean furtherance or encouragement- consistent with the
way similar terms are used in other Code provisions pertaining to tax
shelters. Additionally, courts should recognize that the § 6662 tax

See Countryside,95 Tax Ct Mem Dec (CCH) at 1021-22.
See text accompanying notes 137-42.
187 Valero, 2008 WL 4104368 at *15-16 ("It appears to the Court that the tax avoidance
objective for the step plan preceded whatever business purposes Andersen later developed, not
the other way around.").
188 See Brief for the Appellee, Valero Energy Corp v United States, No 08-3473, *32 n 9 (7th
Cir filed Dec 15, 2008) (available on Westlaw at 2008 WL 5789494) ("[E]vidence in the record
indicates that at least some of the strategy imparted to Valero by Andersen was also a strategy
that Andersen shared with another client.").
185
186
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shelter definition should be limited to listed transactions, nonlisted
transactions that are prepared for multiple taxpayers, and transactions
that are clearly abusive. It does not encompass any transaction in
which the claimed tax benefits are consistent with the Code and
congressional purpose. Armed with this narrower understanding of
tax shelter and this broader understanding of promotion, courts can
ensure that the exception reaches abusive tax planning without
interfering with routine and customized tax advice.

